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Reputation and the Responsibility 
of  International Organizations
Kristina Daugirdas* 
Abstract
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  International 
Organizations have met a sceptical response from many states, international organizations 
(IOs), and academics. This article explains why those Articles can nevertheless have signifi-
cant practical effect. In the course of  doing so, this article fills a crucial gap in the IO litera-
ture, and provides a theoretical account of  why IOs comply with international law. The IO 
Responsibility Articles may spur IOs and their member states to prevent violations and to 
address violations promptly if  they do occur. The key mechanism for realizing these effects 
is transnational discourse among both state and non-state actors in a range of  national and 
international forums. IOs have reason to be especially sensitive to the effects of  this discourse 
on their reputations. A reputation for complying with international law is an important facet 
of  an IO’s legitimacy. The perception that an IO is legitimate is, in turn, crucial to the organ-
ization’s ability to secure cooperation and support from its member states. This article argues 
that IOs and their member states will take action to prevent and address violations of  interna-
tional law in order to deflect threats to IOs’ reputations – and to preserve their effectiveness.
In Haiti, a Creole slogan is repeated on billboards and spray-painted onto cement walls. 
Translated into English, it reads, ‘Cholera is a crime against humanity!’.1 The signs do 
not identify the perpetrator, but there would probably be no cholera in Haiti today 
but for the presence there of  United Nations peacekeepers from Nepal.2 Traditionally, 
international organizations3 (IOs) have been viewed as guardians of  international law 
* Assistant Professor of  Law, University of  Michigan Law School. Email: kdaugir@umich.edu.
1 Krishnaswami, ‘The United Nations’ Shameful History in Haiti’, 19 Aug. 2013, available at www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/08/united_nations_caused_cholera_outbreak_in_
haiti_its_response_violates_international.html (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
2 See infra sect. 3.
3 This article uses the term ‘international organization’ consistently with the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) definition in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  International Organizations: 
‘[A]n organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and pos-
sessing its own legal personality’: ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  International Organizations, 
with Commentaries, in Report on the Work of  Its Sixty-third Session (26 Apr. to 3 June and 4 July to 12 
Aug. 2011), UN Doc. A/66/10, Ch. V [hereinafter IO Responsibility Articles], Art. 2(a).
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rather than as potential violators.4 But occurrences like this one have put IOs under 
new scrutiny. Scholars and advocates have contended that IOs might violate interna-
tional law in various ways. UN peacekeepers might violate international humanitar-
ian law. The IMF might violate the economic, social, and cultural rights of  individuals 
residing in states that borrow from it. And any number of  IOs might violate interna-
tional labour standards in their dealings with their own employees.5
In 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted a set of  draft articles 
on the responsibility of  international organizations (IO Responsibility Articles). These 
Articles seek to clarify both the circumstances that establish an IO’s breach of  an inter-
national obligation and the consequences of  such breaches. To that end, these Articles 
identify when conduct is attributable to an IO rather than a state or private individual. 
They address the circumstances under which violations might be excused. And they 
specify the consequences of  responsibility. According to the IO Responsibility Articles, 
for example, if  the peacekeepers’ actions or omissions are attributable to the UN and 
those actions or omissions constitute a breach of  the UN’s international obligations, 
the UN is obliged to make full reparation for injury caused by the violation.6
Many states and IOs reacted sceptically to the ILC’s undertaking. Draft articles pro-
duced by the ILC often provide the starting point for multilateral treaty negotiations, 
but there are no such plans for the IO Responsibility Articles.7 Many scholars have 
also disparaged the ILC’s efforts. José Alvarez, for one, has described the ILC’s effort as 
‘at best premature and at worst misguided’.8 In his view, the IO Responsibility Articles 
are premature because they are grounded in an extremely limited body of  practice 
and because so many aspects of  the primary norms of  international law that bind 
IOs are unsettled. Addressing the consequences of  violations while the content of  pri-
mary norms remains controversial puts the cart before the horse, Alvarez argues.9 
Separately, Jan Klabbers has questioned the practical effect of  the IO Responsibility 
Articles’ rules, given the absence of  third-party dispute settlement mechanisms that 
can bind IOs.10 Klabbers is surely right that the practical effects of  the articles cannot 
be taken for granted.11
4 Reinisch, ‘Securing the Accountability of  International Organizations’, 7 Global Governance (2001) 131, 
at 131.
5 There are many other examples. See ibid., at 132; Mégret and Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights 
Violator?’, 25 Human Rts Q (2003) 314, at 335–336.
6 IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, Arts 31, 51–57.
7 See infra note 35.
8 Alvarez, ‘Book Review of  Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of  Sovereign 
Powers’, 101 AJIL (2007) 674, at 677.
9 Ibid., at 676–677. See also Alvarez, ‘Misadventures in Subjecthood’, 29 Sept. 2010, available at www.
ejiltalk.org/misadventures-in-statehood/ (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
10 J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, 2009), at 292; see also Alvarez, 
‘Misadventures in Subjecthood’, supra note 9 (arguing that the IO Responsibility Articles are unlikely to 
become ‘legally important’ in the near future because of  the ‘scarcity of  judicial venues to address issues 
of  IO responsibility’).
11 Cf. A.T. Guzman, How International Law Works (2008), at 55 (‘In trying to understand why a state might 
comply with an international obligation, it makes no sense to turn to a rule of  international law that 
says a failure to comply generates an obligation to make reparation. If  there is nothing else to encourage 
compliance with the initial obligation, then the rule requiring reparations will be similarly impotent.’).
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Reputation and the Responsibility of  International Organizations 993
And yet, this article argues, these critics are too pessimistic; the IO Responsibility 
Articles are neither premature nor feckless. On the contrary, the IO Responsibility 
Articles can help to clarify the primary international law norms that bind IOs. There 
are also reasons to think that the IO Responsibility Articles will spur IOs and their 
member states to prevent violations and to address violations promptly if  they occur. 
Realizing these practical effects does not require either negotiating a treaty based on 
the IO Responsibility Articles or developing new dispute settlement mechanisms.
The key mechanism for realizing these effects is decentralized discourse about inter-
national norms. This article uses ‘transnational discourse’ as shorthand to describe this 
discourse, and to emphasize that it takes place among a broad range of  actors and in a 
broad range of  forums. Participants in the discourse include government and IO officials, 
NGOs, national legislators, and private individuals. Forums include not just IOs but also 
national courts and newspaper editorial pages. The IO Responsibility Articles shape this 
discourse by heightening the salience of  IOs’ violations of  international law, increasing 
the likelihood that policy disputes will be framed as violations of  international law, and 
structuring legal arguments over whether IOs have in fact violated international law.
But will IOs and their member states heed this discourse? Legal process and con-
structivist scholars have long argued that such discourse plays a prominent role in 
explaining states’ behaviour. This article argues that IOs’ are likely to be even more 
sensitive to this discourse than states are. IOs’ reputations for compliance with inter-
national law are forged through this transnational discourse. A reputation for comply-
ing with international law is an important facet of  an IO’s legitimacy. The perception 
that an IO is legitimate is, in turn, crucial to that IO’s ability to secure cooperation 
and support from its member states. This article contends that IOs and their member 
states will take action to prevent and address violations of  international law in order 
to deflect threats to IOs’ legitimacy – and to preserve their effectiveness.
Because the ILC adopted the IO Responsibility Articles only recently, it is early to 
look for evidence of  these dynamics, and this account is necessarily somewhat specu-
lative. And yet some empirical support already exists. The article examines the still-
ongoing controversy about claims that the UN violated its international obligations by 
inadvertently bringing cholera to Haiti.
International relations and international legal scholarship is rife with theories 
about why states will – or will not – comply with their international obligations. To 
date, however, efforts to specify IOs’ international obligations and the consequences 
for violating them have proceeded without any parallel effort to develop a theoretical 
account of  why IOs will comply with those obligations. In the course of  providing an 
account of  why the IO Responsibility Articles will have practical effect, this article 
identifies and takes a first step to fill a crucial gap in the literature on IOs.
1 A Tale of  Two Efforts to Codify International 
Responsibility
To understand why critics doubt the prospects of  the IO Responsibility Articles, it is 
helpful to contrast them with the ILC’s previously adopted State Responsibility Articles. 
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The ILC took up the topic of  IO responsibility just as it was wrapping up a decades-long 
effort to adopt a set of  articles governing the responsibility of  states for violations of  
international law. At first glance, the IO Responsibility Articles quite closely track the 
State Responsibility Articles on matters of  both substance and process.
A Substance
According to the ILC, both the State and IO Responsibility Articles address ‘secondary’ 
rules of  international law.12 That is, they address the ‘general conditions under inter-
national law for the State [or IO] to be considered responsible for wrongful actions 
or omissions, and the legal consequences that flow therefrom’. Neither set of  articles 
addresses primary rules, or ‘the content of  international obligations, the breach of  
which gives rise to responsibility’.13 These primary rules are found instead in the inter-
national agreements that establish IOs, in treaties to which states or IOs are parties, 
and in general international law.
Although they address the same set of  issues, the IO Responsibility Articles are 
grounded in far less practice than the State Responsibility Articles.14 Indeed, when the 
ILC asked selected IOs to document their responses when charged with violating inter-
national law, several reported that no such claims had ever been made.15 The scarcity 
of  practice reflects in part the comparative novelty of  IOs (which did not exist in large 
numbers before World War II) and of  the idea that IOs are both capable of  violating 
international law and responsible for the consequences of  such violations. The scar-
city of  practice also reflects the paucity of  third-party dispute settlement mechanisms 
for resolving legal questions about violations of  international law by IOs, as well as the 
difficulty of  accessing those that do exist.16
Because the ILC could draw on only a limited body of  practice, its work on IO respon-
sibility was primarily an exercise in the progressive development of  international law. 
The ILC has acknowledged as much.17 By contrast, the State Responsibility Articles 
are built on a much larger body of  practice, and most of  the articles have a plausible 
claim to reflect existing customary international law.
Even the fundamental premise at the heart of  the IO Responsibility Articles – that 
‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of  an international organization entails the interna-
tional responsibility of  that organization’18 – is not beyond doubt. Writing in 1963, the ILC 
Special Rapporteur on state responsibility found it ‘questionable whether such organizations 
12 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries 
[hereinafter State Responsibility Articles], Yearbook of  the ILC (2001), Vol. II, Part 2, at 31, para. 1; IO 
Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67, para. 3; but see Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility 
in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’, 34 Michigan J Int’l L (2013) 359, at 408–412 (noting 
that some responsibility rules are primary rules under this classification).
13 State Responsibility Articles, supra note 12, at 31 para. 1; IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67.
14 IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67–68, para. 5.
15 ILC, Responsibility of  International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from 
International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/545, 25 June 2004, at 33.
16 Klabbers, supra note 10, at 292.
17 IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67–68, para. 5.
18 Ibid., Art. 3.
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Reputation and the Responsibility of  International Organizations 995
had the capacity to commit international[ly] wrongful acts’.19 Fifty years later, most aca-
demics have come to accept the position that IOs have international legal obligations and 
incur international responsibility when they violate them.20 This view builds on the ICJ’s 
1949 Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion, in which the ICJ held that the UN has inter-
national personality separate from its member states – and that the UN is therefore ‘capable 
of  possessing international rights and duties’.21 The ICJ has since extended this reasoning 
to other IOs.22 Yet the ICJ has never directly addressed the consequences of  IOs violating 
international obligations.
Many commentators insist that if  IOs are capable of  having their own inter-
national obligations, it is only logical that IOs themselves are responsible for the 
violations.23 If  the IOs were not responsible, then their member states would be 
responsible in their stead, and this outcome contradicts the separate legal personal-
ity of  the IO.24 The alternative – that nobody would be responsible – is widely con-
sidered intolerable.25
The neatness of  this logical chain notwithstanding, practice supporting the basic 
proposition that IOs are responsible for violations of  international law is surprisingly 
thin. The ILC commentary quotes the UN Secretary-General explaining the UN’s long-
standing practice of  settling claims related to injuries caused by UN peacekeepers in 
terms of  the organization’s international responsibility.26 But the UN has also explained 
this practice in terms of  its treaty obligations under the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of  the United Nations (the General Convention).27 Section 29 of  the General 
Convention requires the UN to ‘make provision for appropriate modes of  settlement’ of  
19 ILC, Report by Mr. Roberto Ago, Chairman of  the Sub-Committee on State Responsibility, Yearbook of  the 
ILC (1963), Vol. II, at 228–229; see also ibid., at 234 (comments of  Jiménez de Aréchaga).
20 Alvarez, supra note 8, at 676–677.
21 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of  the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 Apr. 1949, ICJ 
Reports (1949) 174, at 179.
22 Interpretation of  the Agreement of  25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 20 Dec. 
1980, ICJ Reports (1980) 73, at 89–90.
23 ILC, State Responsibility, International Responsibility: Report by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur, 
Yearbook of  the ILC (1956), Vol. II, 173, at 190, para. 83; P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of  International 
Institutions (6th edn, 2009), at 518; Pellet, ‘The Definition of  Responsibility in International Law’, in 
J. Crawford et al. (eds), The Law of  International Responsibility (2010), at 3, 6–7.
24 See, e.g., H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (4th rev. edn, 2003), at 1006, 
sec. 1583.
25 See, e.g., M.  Hirsch, The Responsibility of  International Organizations towards Third Parties: Some Basic 
Principles (1995), at 8; see also Arsanjani, ‘Claims against International Organizations: Quis Custodiet 
Ipsos Custodes’, 7 Yale J World Public Order (1980) 131, at 132.
26 IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 78 (quoting statement from UN GA, Report of  the Secretary-
General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of  the Financing of  United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, UN Doc. A/51/389, 20 Sept. 1996, at 4).
27 UN Secretary-General, Letter Dated 6 Aug. 1965 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the Acting 
Permanent Representative of  the Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics, reprinted in United Nations Juridical 
Yearbook (1965), Part One, ch. 2, at 41; Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of  the Financing of  the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 26, at 4, para. 7; Report of  the Secretary General, Administrative 
and Budgetary Aspects of  the Financing of  the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/51/903, 
21 May 1997, paras 10 and 43; Shraga, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of  International 
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage’, 94 AJIL (2000) 406, at 409.
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‘disputes of  a private law character’ and disputes involving ‘any official of  the United 
Nations who by reason of  his official position enjoys immunity’.28 These disputes do not 
necessarily involve violations of  international law; the UN includes arbitration clauses 
in its commercial contracts and leases pursuant to section 29, for example.29
The only other support the ILC adduces is a quotation from the ICJ’s 1999 advisory 
opinion, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of  a Special Rapporteur of  the 
Commission on Human Rights.30 But this case has nothing to do with the responsibility 
of  the UN for violations of  international law. The case arose after Malaysian companies 
sued a UN Special Rapporteur for defamation based on comments he made during an 
interview with a magazine reporter. ICJ held that the Special Rapporteur was immune 
from suit in national courts. The ICJ’s opinion concluded with the observation that the 
‘question of  immunity from legal process is distinct from the issue of  compensation’, and 
even if  the UN is immune it may ‘be required to bear responsibility for the damage arising 
from such acts’ because of  section 29 of  the General Convention.31 The ICJ’s statement is 
a description of  the UN’s primary obligations under the General Convention – not a state-
ment about the consequences of  violations of  international law. Special Rapporteur’s 
allegedly defamatory acts may have caused harm and violated Malaysian law, but there is 
no claim that the Special Rapporteur or the UN violated international law.
The ILC had even less practice to draw on when it moved beyond the basic principle of  
IO responsibility for violations of  international law. To formulate a complete set of  articles 
on IO Responsibility, the ILC relied heavily on the State Responsibility Articles. ‘It would be 
unreasonable for the Commission to take a different approach on issues relating to interna-
tional organizations that are parallel to those concerning States’, ILC Special Rapporteur 
Gaja explained, ‘unless there are specific reasons to do so.’32 In the end, almost two-thirds 
of  the IO Responsibility Articles directly track their counterparts in the State Responsibility 
Articles.33 Many states, IOs, and academics complained that the ILC failed to justify the 
substantive similarities between the IO and State Responsibility Articles.34
28 Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of  the United Nations 1946, 1 UNTS 16.
29 Report of  the Secretary-General, Procedures in Place for Implementation of  Article VIII, section 29, of  
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of  the United Nations, UN Doc. A/C.5/49/65, 24 Apr. 
1995, para. 3.
30 IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, Art. 3, at 78.
31 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of  a Special Rapporteur of  the Commission on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion, 29 Apr. 1999, ICJ Reports (1999) 62, at 88–89, para. 66.
32 ILC, Responsibility of  International Organizations, First Report on Responsibility of  International 
Organizations, by Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, 26 Mar. 2003, at 6.
33 IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, Arts 3–5, 9, 11–16, 19–21, 23–24, 26–31, 33–39, 41–47, 
54–57, 60, 65–67.
34 See, e.g., ILC. Responsibility of  International Organizations, Comments and Observations Received 
from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/636, 14 Feb. 2011, at 5–7 (Austria); ibid., at 8 (Portugal); ILC, 
Responsibility of  International Organizations, Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/636/Add. 1, 13 Apr. 2011, at 4–5 (Republic of  Korea); ILC, Responsibility of  
International Organizations, Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/637, 14 Feb. 2011, at 8 (ILO); ibid., at 9 (IMF); ibid., at 10 (joint comments from 13 
international organizations); see also Ahlborn, ‘The Use of  Analogies in Drafting the Articles on the 
Responsibility of  International Organizations: An Appraisal of  the “Copy-Paste” Approach’, 9 IOLR 
(2013) 53 (arguing the ILC should have used closer analogies with the State Responsibility Articles in 
order to improve the overall coherence of  the law of  international responsibility). But see Amerasinghe, 
‘Comments on the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  International Organizations’, 9 IOLR 
(2013) 29, at 29 (arguing that the parallelism between the two sets of  articles is ‘acceptable and correct’).
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Reputation and the Responsibility of  International Organizations 997
In the end, then, many of  the individual articles on IO Responsibility have little 
claim to reflect extant international law, and as proposals to progressively develop the 
law they are controversial.
B Process
Turning from substance to process, the State and IO Responsibility Articles again 
initially appear similar. When the ILC completed its work on each set of  articles, it 
recommended that the General Assembly ‘take note’ of  its work instead of  proceed-
ing towards a multilateral treaty.35 But these identical recommendations obscure very 
different levels of  political support for the two projects. The states that opposed nego-
tiating a treaty based on the State Responsibility Articles were motivated by a desire 
to protect the ILC’s work: they feared that an unsuccessful multilateral negotiation 
would undermine claims that the State Responsibility Articles reflect existing custom-
ary international law.36 In contrast, the main reason for not pursuing a convention 
based on the IO Responsibility Articles appears to be a pronounced lack of  enthusiasm 
for the ILC’s project among many states and IOs.37
Commentators expected the State Responsibility Articles to be influential even if  
they were not codified in a treaty. David Caron argued that international judges and 
arbitrators would be especially likely to apply an ‘apparently neutral external source’ 
like the State Responsibility Articles.38 These intuitions proved correct, as a wealth of  
subsequent decisions attests.39 By contrast, international courts and arbitrators will 
have few opportunities to apply the IO Responsibility Articles because disputes with 
IOs are so rarely resolved by third-party dispute settlement mechanisms.
35 See State Responsibility Articles, supra note 12, para. 72; IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 51, 
para. 85. These recommendations deviated from what had been the ILC’s normal practice for many years. 
Murphy, ‘Codification, Progressive Development, or Scholarly Analysis? The Art of  Packaging the ILC’s 
Work Product’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), Responsibility of  International Organizations: Essays in Memory of  Sir 
Ian Brownlie (2013) 29, at 32–33.
36 ILC, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/517, 2–3 Apr. 2001, para. 23 (describing negotiations as potentially destabilizing or ‘decodifying’); 
ibid., at 18 (Austria); ILC, State Responsibility, Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 
19 Mar., 3 Apr., 1 May and 28 June 2001, UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, at 19 (Netherlands);  ibid., at 21 (United 
States).
37 See supra note 34. When the IO Responsibility Articles were discussed in the General Assembly’s 
Sixth Committee following the ILC’s recommendation, states’ comments continued to reflect 
mixed reactions: see generally Sixth Committee, Summary Record of  the 20th Meeting, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/66/SR.20, 26 Oct. 2011. For negative comments from a group of  15 IOs see ibid., paras 
92–93.
38 Caron, ‘The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form and 
Authority’, 96 AJIL (2002) 857, at 866, 868; see also J.  Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-
Makers (2005), at 312.
39 See UN GA, Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Compilation of  Decisions of  
International Courts, Tribunals, and Other Bodies, Report of  the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/62/62, 1 
Feb. 2007, para. 5; Olleson, ‘The Impact of  the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: Preliminary Draft’ (2007), available at www.biicl.org/files/3107_impactofthearticleson-
state_responsibilitypreliminarydraftfinal.pdf  (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
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The remainder of  this article explains why, notwithstanding lukewarm political 
support from states and IOs, the IO Responsibility Articles are not a dead letter. On the 
contrary, they promise to be influential – but not for the same reasons that the State 
Responsibility Articles have been.
2 The IO Responsibility Articles in Transnational Discourse
The view that the IO Responsibility Articles are condemned to irrelevance overlooks 
or unduly discounts the ways in which the IO Responsibility Articles can influence 
transnational discourse – and the reasons why IOs and their member states are espe-
cially sensitive to that discourse. This section describes that discourse and how the 
IO Responsibility Articles have already begun to shape it. Section 3 illustrates how 
the IO Responsibility Articles have been deployed in transnational discourse regarding 
cholera in Haiti – and how that discourse has contributed to clarification about the 
UN’s primary obligations and spurred some action by the UN. Section 4 explains why 
and how transnational discourse is likely to affect the actions and decisions of  IOs and 
their member states more generally.
International relations scholars who take a constructivist approach and interna-
tional lawyers who embrace ‘legal process’ theories have long agreed that discourse 
about international norms matters. Rejecting the idea that states’ interests are fixed, 
constructivists maintain that discourse shapes states’ interests.40 Legal process the-
orists emphasize how discourse can cause states to comply with their international 
legal obligations.41 Both constructivists and legal process theorists have identified IOs 
as important venues42 – and IO officials as important participants43 – in this discourse. 
But they have paid less attention to how such discourse might influence what IOs do.
Transnational discourse is decentralized. State officials participate in that dis-
course. But while states are the key actors deciding whether the IO Responsibility 
Articles will become a treaty, state officials do not have a monopoly on transnational 
discourse. Other participants in transnational discourse include international civil 
servants, multinational enterprises, civil society organizations, and private individ-
uals. They engage in discourse about IOs’ legal norms in a range of  forums. These 
participants can play three distinct roles in this discourse: they can initiate and per-
petuate discussion, they can contribute new legal arguments or relevant facts, and 
they can evaluate legal arguments.
Because the motivations and interests of  transnational actors diverge, some trans-
national actors will be willing to press arguments that other transnational actors 
would prefer to avoid. For example, national legislatures may be willing to raise 
40 For a helpful distillation of  constructivist theories see Brunnée and Toope, ‘International Law and 
Constructivism’, 39 Columbia J Transnat’l L (2000) 19, at 25–33.
41 See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
42 A. Chayes and A.  Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty (1995), at 125.; I.  Johnstone, The Power of  
Deliberation (2011), at 5.
43 Chayes and Chayes, supra note 42, at 275–276; Johnstone, ‘The Role of  the UN Secretary-General’, 9 
Global Governance (2003) 441, at 441.
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Reputation and the Responsibility of  International Organizations 999
challenges to IO action about which executive branch officials would be content to 
remain silent.44 One IO (or part of  an IO) may be in a position to question another IO 
(or part of  the same IO).45 Finally, non-state actors – and NGOs in particular – may 
press legal arguments that governments may be unable or unwilling to make for a 
variety of  reasons.
The availability of  diverse forums for making legal arguments allows trans-
national actors to seek out those forums that are most congenial to their positions. 
International courts and arbitral tribunals are neither the only important venues nor 
indispensable ones. Transnational discourse can occur in national legislatures, as well 
as in the pages of  academic journal articles and newspapers.46 Some forums can be 
useful even though they are formally unavailable to hear particular claims. IOs typi-
cally enjoy immunity from suit in national courts, for example, but these courts can 
nevertheless be important venues for transnational discourse. Even if  cases filed in 
national courts are ultimately dismissed, those cases can call attention to challenged 
actions or omissions by IOs.
 The IO Responsibility Articles are likely to influence transnational discourse about 
IOs in the following ways. Transnational actors are likely to cite them for the same rea-
sons that international courts and tribunals so readily turn to the State Responsibility 
Articles.47 Both sets of  articles offer a detailed, readily accessible, and ostensibly neu-
tral set of  rules that specify when IOs are responsible for violations of  international 
law. Indeed, transnational actors seeking to bolster their legal claims would be foolish 
not to invoke them.
The IO Responsibility Articles may also increase the quantity of  transnational dis-
course about IOs that is framed in legal terms.48 By heightening the salience of  IO vio-
lations of  international law, the IO Responsibility Articles may indirectly encourage 
transnational actors to frame their policy disputes with various IOs in these terms.49 
The result is not only more discourse about the topic the IO Responsibility Articles 
address directly – the consequences of  violations of  international law. The result is 
also more discourse about the content of  the primary norms that bind IOs.
44 See, e.g., Daugirdas, ‘Congress Underestimated: The Case of  the World Bank’, 107 AJIL (2013) 517; 
Deshman, ‘Horizontal Review between International Organizations: Why, How, and Who Cares about 
Corporate Regulatory Capture’, 22 EJIL (2011) 1089, at 1108–1112.
45 Reinisch, ‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of  the Security Council for 
the Imposition of  Economic Sanctions’, 95 AJIL (2001) 851, at 868–869; Deshman, supra note 44, at 
1097–1098 (describing criticisms of  the WHO by the Parliamentary Assembly of  the Council of  Europe).
46 See, e.g., Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’, 106 Yale LJ (1997) 2599, at 2646–2647 
(describing legal debates about the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as ‘rag[ing] in many fora: Senate hear-
ings, debates over other arms control treaties, journal articles, and op-ed columns’).
47 See supra note 38.
48 Cf. Bederman, ‘Counterintuiting Countermeasures’, 96 AJIL (2002) 817, at 832 (‘writing a rule book for 
self-help may actually encourage governments to play a game of  punch and counterpunch that they had 
previously avoided.’).
49 Cf. Higgins, ‘The Place of  International Law in the Settlement of  Disputes by the Security Council’, 64 
AJIL (1970) 1, at 17 (explaining that although the SC need not assert non-compliance with international 
law to trigger its authorities, it often does because ‘the behavior of  a state is not easily challenged on 
grounds of  “policy”; it is clearly preferable, if  one wishes to gain the support of  those not directly involved, 
to show it as a departure from legal obligations’.).
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Consider some examples. The World Trade Organization (WTO) reported to the ILC 
in 2002 that ‘no claim was ever made against the WTO alleging a violation of  inter-
national law’.50 Since then, academic commentators have begun to explore how the 
WTO might violate international law.51 The World Health Organization (WHO) like-
wise reported that ‘to our knowledge no such claims have ever been made against the 
WHO’.52 A recently published article contends that that ought to change, arguing that 
the WHO ought to be responsible under international law for the acts of  public–pri-
vate partnerships in which it participates.53
NGOs are increasingly invoking the IO Responsibility Articles to reinforce their 
arguments about IOs’ obligations and the consequences of  violations. Recently 
Amnesty International, along with several other NGOs, submitted a written state-
ment to the Human Rights Council urging it focus on the human rights obligations 
of  the international financial institutions (IFIs) including the World Bank.54 After all, 
as the written statement explains, the ILC’s Articles on IO Responsibility ‘confirm[s] 
that intergovernmental organizations, such as IFIs, are subjects of  international law, 
and as such they have international law obligations that they must comply with’.55 
Several months earlier, Human Rights Watch had issued its own report addressing the 
World Bank’s legal obligations to respect and protect human rights – and invoking the 
Articles on IO Responsibility to support its arguments.56
3 Transnational Discourse in Action: Cholera in Haiti
Since the adoption of  the IO Responsibility Articles, the most extensive transnational 
discourse regarding IO obligations and the consequences of  violations has involved 
allegations that the UN inadvertently introduced cholera into Haiti. This section dem-
onstrates how non-state actors initiated and perpetuated that discourse. They also 
introduced new legal arguments and relevant factual information, and evaluated legal 
arguments made by other actors – especially the UN. This section also rebuts the claim 
that the IO Responsibility Articles are not premature because disagreement persists 
about the IOs’ primary international law obligations. Clarity about IOs’ primary obli-
gations need not precede the development of  the IO Responsibility Articles because the 
50 UN Doc. A/CN.4/545, supra note 15, at 33.
51 Gal-Or and Ryngaert, ‘From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Relevance of  the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of  International Organizations (DARIO) – The Responsibility of  the WTO and the UN’, 13 
German LJ (2012) 511, at 540.
52 UN Doc. A/CN.4/545, supra note 15, at 33.
53 Clarke, ‘Responsibility of  International Organizations under International Law for the Acts of  Global 
Health Public-Private Partnerships’, 12 Chinese J Int’l L (2011) 55.
54 See Amnesty International’s Written Statement for the 24th Session of  the Human Rights Council, ‘The 
World Bank and Other International Financial Institutions Must Uphold Human Rights in All Activities 
They Support’, 16 Sept. 2013, available online at amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/IOR41/020/2013/en/
e379235b-84ea-4062-898d-a17506b28340/ior410202013en.pdf  (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
55 Ibid., at 3.
56 Human Rights Watch, Abuse-Free Development: How the World Bank Should Safeguard Against Human 
Rights Violations (2013), at 26–29.
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IO Responsibility Articles themselves can help to achieve that clarity. In fact, the trans-
national discourse about the UN’s role and obligations in connection with cholera in 
Haiti has shed light on some of  the UN’s primary legal obligations. Finally, this section 
describes how the UN’s position has shifted since that discourse began. Although it is 
impossible to establish definitively why those shifts occurred, the next section argues 
that IOs have reasons to be especially sensitive to such transnational discourse.
UN peacekeepers were already in Haiti when a devastating earthquake struck on 12 
January 2010. The Security Council had established the UN Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH57) six years earlier in the wake of  a contested presidential election 
that resulted in armed conflict in several cities across Haiti.58 After the earthquake 
struck, the Security Council increased MINUSTAH’s force levels and expanded its 
mandate to include supporting recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts.59
Ten months after the earthquake, on 22 October 2010, the Haiti National Public 
Health Laboratory confirmed the first cholera case in Haiti in nearly a century.60 Since 
then, more than 700,000 individuals have been infected, and more than 8,500 have 
died from cholera.61
Within 10 days of  the first confirmed case, the US Centers for Disease Control identi-
fied the bacteria strain that caused the outbreak as ‘similar to a cholera strain found in 
South Asia’.62 Suspicions that the UN peacekeepers and the cholera were linked arose 
quickly. The UN spokesperson for MINUSTAH nevertheless denied any ‘objective link 
. . . between the soldiers and the outbreak’.63
On 6 January 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed an independent 
panel to investigate the source of  the cholera outbreak.64 That panel did not explic-
itly identify MINUSTAH as the source of  the cholera. But the panel found that the 
sanitation conditions at the Mirebalais MINUSTAH camp were insufficient to prevent 
contamination of  the Meye Tributary System of  the Artibonite River. And the panel 
concluded that ‘the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the source 
of  the Haiti cholera outbreak was due to contamination of  the Meye Tributary of  the 
Artibonite River with a pathogenic strain of  current South Asian type Vibrio cholorae 
as a result of  human activity’.65
According to press reports, a UN spokesperson said the panel’s report ‘does not 
present any conclusive scientific evidence linking the outbreak to the MINUSTAH 
57 MINUSTAH is the French acronym for Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en Haïti.
58 SC Res. 1542 (2004); Report of  the Secretary-General on Haiti, UN Doc. S/2004/300, 16 Apr. 2004.
59 SC Res. 1908 (2010) and SC Res. 1927 (2010).
60 Final Report of  the Independent Panel of  Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, May 2011, at 3, avail-
able at www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf  (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
61 UN Fact Sheet: Combatting Cholera in Haiti, Dec. 2013, at 6–7, available at www.un.org/News/dh/info-
cus/haiti/haiticholerafactsheet-december-2013.pdf  (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
62 Centers for Disease Control, Press Release, ‘Laboratory Test Results of  Cholera Outbreak Strain in Haiti 
Announced’, 1 Nov. 2010, available at www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2010/r101101.html (last visited 
24 Nov. 2014).
63 Booth, ‘U.N. Troops Assaulted, Blamed for Outbreak’, Washington Post, 16 Nov. 2010, at A9.
64 UN News Centre Press Release, ‘Haiti: Ban Appoints Four Top Medical Experts to Probe Source of  Cholera 
Epidemic’, 6 Jan. 2011.
65 Final Report of  the Independent Panel of  Experts, supra note 60, at 29.
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peacekeepers or the Mirebalais camp’.66 The Secretary-General issued a statement 
indicating that he intends to ‘convene a task force within the United Nations system, 
to study the findings and recommendations made by the Independent Panel of  Experts 
to ensure prompt and appropriate follow-up’.67
NGOs first pressed the argument that the UN had violated its international legal 
obligations. In November 2011, the Boston-based Institute for Justice and Democracy 
(IJDH), working together with a human rights group in Haiti, initiated transnational 
discourse – and made arguments that Haiti and other UN member states were either 
unable or unwilling to make – when they presented Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
with a formal petition.68
The petitioners argued that the UN acted ‘negligently, recklessly, and with deliber-
ate indifference for the Petitioners’ health and lives’69 – and that the UN’s actions and 
omissions relating to the introduction of  cholera violated several different interna-
tional obligations. The petitioners alleged that the UN violated the Status of  Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) between the UN and Haiti, which required the UN to respect 
Haitian law.70 They also argued that the UN failed to comply with international envi-
ronmental principles and violated the petitioners’ fundamental human rights.71
Separately, the petitioners argued that the UN had obligations to provide compensa-
tion under treaty law, customary international law, and the IO Responsibility Articles. 
The petitioners cited section 29 of  the General Convention (which requires the UN to 
‘make provisions for the settlement’ of  specified categories of  disputes72) and a provi-
sion of  the SOFA that calls for the establishment of  a standing claims commission to 
settle ‘third-party claims for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness, or 
death arising from or directly attributed to MINUSTAH’.73 The petitioners also argued 
that the UN has obligations under the UN Charter and customary international law to 
provide an effective remedy. Finally, and most importantly for my purposes, the peti-
tioners argued that the law of  IO responsibility requires the UN to ‘make full repara-
tion for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act’.74
By filing this petition with the UN, IJDH also prompted legal discourse within 
the UN, which needed to respond in some way. The UN took its time in doing so; 
the claimants heard nothing for 15  months. But on 21 February 2013, the UN 
Secretary-General informed Haitian President Michel Martelly that the UN had 
66 ‘UN Haiti Cholera Panel Avoids Blaming Peacekeepers’, Reuters, 5 May 2011.
67 Secretary-General Press Statement, Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-
General on the Independent Expert Panel’s Report Regarding the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, 4 May 2011, 
available at www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=5245 (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
68 JDH Petition for Relief, available at ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/englishpeti-
tionREDACTED.pdf  (last visited 24 Nov. 2014), paras 72–83.
69 Ibid., para. 72.
70 Ibid., para. 80.
71 Ibid., paras 81–83.
72 See supra note 28.
73 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of  Haiti Concerning the Status of  the United 
Nations Operation in Haiti 2004 [hereinafter UN-Haiti SOFA], 2271 UNTS 235, Arts 54–55.
74 Ibid., para. 95.
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rejected the petition.75 Patricia O’Brien, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal 
Affairs, supplied a written response. Most of  her letter addressed efforts by the UN 
to combat cholera in Haiti and to improve sanitation. The letter included only two 
sentences about the legal arguments in the petition, and those addressed only the 
General Convention:
With respect to the claims submitted, consideration of  these claims would necessarily include a 
review of  political and policy matters. Accordingly, these claims are not receivable pursuant to 
Section 29 [of  the General Convention].76
In this initial response, the UN thus ignored most of  the legal arguments that 
IJDH made.
Once the UN had publicly provided a reason (however thin) for denying the petition, 
transnational actors were in a position to evaluate the UN’s position. Unsurprisingly, 
IJDH found the UN’s rationale unsatisfying, and followed up with another letter 
challenging O’Brien’s interpretation of  the General Convention and its consistency 
with the UN’s own practice.77 O’Brien’s response to this second missive was brief. It 
repeated the UN position that the petitioners’ claims were ‘not receivable’.78 It also 
included a sentence addressing the argument that the SOFA required the establish-
ment of  a standing claims commission. The UN asserted that ‘[t]here is no legal basis 
for the United Nations to establish such a commission in respect of  claims that are not 
receivable’.79
The events that followed highlight how transnational actors can perpetuate trans-
national discourse. Although O’Brien’s letters signalled the UN’s desire to consider 
the matter closed, transnational discourse continued in other forums. Rejection of  
the petition received extensive and uniformly critical press coverage.80 Nineteen mem-
bers of  the US Congress sent a letter to Secretary-General Ban urging him to ‘use 
[his] office and [his] influence to ensure that the UN takes responsibility for the intro-
duction of  cholera into Haiti’.81 Advocates in Haiti contemplated suing the Haitian 
75 Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on Haiti, 21 Feb. 2013, available at 
www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=6615 (last visited 24 Nov. 2014); Roshan Lall and Pilkington, ‘UN Will 
Not Compensate Haiti Cholera Victims, Ban Ki-Moon Tells President’, The Guardian, 21 Feb. 2013.
76 Letter from Patricia O’Brien, UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, to Brian Concannon, 
Attorney for the Haitian Cholera Victims (21 Feb. 2013), available at opiniojuris.org/wp-content/
uploads/LettertoMr.BrianConcannon.pdf  (last visited 3 Dec. 2014).
77 Letter from Mario Joseph et  al. to Patricia O’Brien, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs (7 May 
2013), available at www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Cholera-Victims-Response-to-UN-
Final.pdf  (last visited 3 Dec. 2014).
78 Letter from Patricia O’Brien, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, to Brian Concannon, Director, 
Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (5 July 2013), available at www.ijdh.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/20130705164515.pdf  (last visited 3 Dec. 2014).
79 Ibid.
80 See, e.g., Rosen, ‘How the U.N. Caused Haiti’s Cholera Crisis – and Won’t Be Held Responsible’, The Atlantic 
26 Feb. 2013; ‘Justice in Haiti: Double Standard’, The Economist, 2 Mar. 2013.
81 See ‘Congresswoman Waters Urges United Nations to Commit Resources to Eradicate Cholera in Haiti’, 
available at waters.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=336057 (text of  letter from 
Maxine Waters signed by 18 additional members, dated 30 May 2013) (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
 at U
niversity of M
ichigan L
aw
 L
ibrary on February 5, 2015
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1004 EJIL 25 (2014), 991–1018
government seeking to compel it to seek compensation from the UN.82 A  team of  
Brazilian lawyers has reportedly filed a case against the UN in the Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights on behalf  of  Haitian cholera victims.83 Even the members of  
the panel appointed by the Secretary-General re-entered the discourse. On their own 
initiative, they released a follow-up report in July 2013. Citing research completed 
after their original report was released, the panel members stated: ‘[T]he preponder-
ance of  the evidence and the weight of  the circumstantial evidence does lead to the 
conclusion that personnel associated with the Mirebalais MINUSTAH facility were the 
most likely source of  introduction of  cholera into Haiti.’84
Another group associated with Yale University (referred to here as the Yale Group) 
issued a report in August 2013 that pressed a set of  arguments similar to those in 
the IJDH’s petition. The Yale Group’s report argued that the UN had violated (1) its 
obligations under the SOFA and (2) its human rights obligations by failing to respect 
the right to water, the right to health, the right against the arbitrary deprivation of  
life, and the right to an effective remedy.85 The report also rejected the interpretation 
of  the General Convention contained in O’Brien’s letter. The report cited both the IO 
Responsibility Articles and comments the UN made to the ILC to support its claims 
that ‘when a peacekeeping force breaches an international obligation of  the U.N., the 
organization is responsible both for the breach and for remedying it’.86
In September 2013, Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe addressed cholera when 
he spoke before the General Assembly. His restrained comments reflect the difficulty of  
making demands on the UN while relying heavily on its assistance. ‘While we continue 
to believe that the United Nations has a moral responsibility in this epidemic, it neverthe-
less remains true that the UN remains supportive of  the efforts of  the Government and 
various national and international agencies involved to eradicate this scourge’, he said.87
On 9 October 2013, IJDH initiated transnational discourse in a new forum: it filed 
an action in the Southern District of  New York against the UN.88 The complaint does 
not cite the IO Responsibility Articles, but does observe that it is ‘well-established under 
international law and UN documents, resolutions, reports and treaties that Defendants 
UN and MINUSTAH can incur legal liability and have an obligation to provide compen-
sation for injury caused by them’.89 The UN’s immunity from suit is well-established in 
82 Yale Transnational Development Clinic et al., ‘Peacekeeping without Accountability: The United Nations’ 
Responsibility for the Haitian Cholera Epidemic’ (2013) [hereinafter Yale Study], at 16, available at www.
law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics/Haiti_TDC_Final_Report.pdf  (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
83 Ibid.
84 Colum Lynch, ‘Cholera Outbreak in Haiti in 2010 Tied to U.N. Peacekeepers, Report Says’, Washington 
Post, 25 July 2013; Lantagne et al.,’ The Cholera Outbreak in Haiti: Where and How Did it Begin?’, 379 
Current Topics in Microbiology and Immunology (2014), at 145.
85 Yale Study, supra note 82, at 35–42.
86 Ibid., at 36 and notes 211 and 219.
87 ‘At UN, Haitian Leader Urges “Second Look” at Island Nation, Where Real Progress is Taking Hold’, UN 
News Centre, 26 Sept. 2013, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46067 (last visited 
3 Dec. 2014).
88 Georges v. United Nations, Civil Action No. 13-cv-07146-JPO (SDNY) (filed 9 Oct. 2013).
89 Ibid., Complaint, para. 173; see also ibid., at para. 11 (‘Defendants UN and MINUSTAH have well-estab-
lished legal obligations to provide redress to victims of  harm caused by acts or omissions attributable to 
the Defendants.’).
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US law, and the US government has filed a brief  supporting the UN’s immunity in the 
action brought by IJDH.90 As the lawyers who filed the case know, the likelihood that 
their action will be dismissed hardly makes it pointless. On the contrary, such actions 
call attention to the facts of  the case and spur further transnational discourse. Indeed, 
news of  the action quickly spread across the globe. The New York Times published an 
editorial emphasizing that ‘even a body immune to legal claims cannot shed account-
ability’.91 Newspapers in South Africa picked up the message too, publishing editorials 
calling on the UN to ‘acknowledge responsibility, apologize to Haitians, and give the vic-
tims the means to file claims against it for the harm they say has been done to them’.92
The publicity surrounding the court action prompted a key UN official to reveal that 
IJDH’s petition had already prompted considerable discussion and reflection within 
the UN itself. Speaking at an awards ceremony in Geneva, UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Navi Pillay spoke out in favour of  compensation. She said, ‘I have 
used my voice both inside the United Nations and outside to call for the right – for an 
investigation by the United Nations, by the country concerned, and I still stand by the 
call that victims of  – of  those who suffered as a result of  that cholera be provided with 
compensation’.93 Responding to Pillay’s comments, Nicole Phillips, a lawyer for IJDH, 
underscored that the federal district court was not the only – or even the most import-
ant – forum for resolving the dispute. As she put it, ‘public support for the cholera 
victims’ claims could be a game changer in their claims against the U.N.’.94
In the months that followed, transnational discourse continued in other forums. In 
January 2014, 65 members of  the US Congress wrote a letter to the US Ambassador 
to the UN emphasizing that the ‘United Nations has a moral and legal obligation to 
redress the harm resulting from the actions of  its peacekeeping operations’.95 Because 
of  the US Congress’s role in appropriating funds for the UN, members of  Congress 
can be particularly influential participants in transnational discourse. In March, two 
additional actions by Haitian victims were filed in US courts.96 The next month, an 
independent expert on the situation of  human rights in Haiti, appointed by the UN 
Human Rights Council, called for the establishment of  a reparation commission for 
cholera victims ‘to enable damages to be recorded, corresponding benefits or compen-
sation paid, the persons responsible to be identified, the epidemic to be stopped and 
other measures to be implemented’.97
90 Statement of  Interest of  the United States filed 7 Mar. 2014, Georges v. United Nations, No. 1:13-cv-07146 
(SDNY, filed 10 Oct. 2013).
91 Editorial, ‘Haiti’s Imported Disaster’, New York Times, 13 Oct. 2013.
92 Editorial, ‘Man-Made Disaster’, Cape Times (South Africa), 14 Oct. 2013, at E1; Editorial, ‘UN Must 
Apologize’, The Mercury (South Africa), 14 Oct. 2013.
93 Quoted in ‘UN Human Rights Official Urges Compensation for Haiti Cholera Victims’, AP, 8 Oct. 2013.
94 Ibid.
95 Letter from Congressman John Conyers and Others to Samantha Power, US Permanent Representative 
to the UN (10 Jan. 2014), available at conyers.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/1/conyers-64-colleagues-
write-ambassador-samantha-power-urging-un-to-take-responsibility-remedial-action-for-haiti-cholera-
outbreak (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
96 Complaint, Jean-Robert v.  United Nations, Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-1545 (SDNY, filed 6 Mar. 2014); 
Complaint, LaVenture v. United Nations, Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-1611 (EDNY, filed 11 Mar. 2014).
97 Office of  the High Commissioner of  Human Rights, Report of  the Independent Expert on the Situation of  
Human Rights in Haiti, Gustavo Gallón, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/71, 7 Feb. 2014, para. 83(f).
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The UN’s terse declaration that the petitioners’ original claim was ‘not receivable’ 
under the General Convention has become a focal point for further transnational 
discourse among a still broader set of  actors with expertise to evaluate it. None has 
endorsed the UN’s position. Bruce Rashkow, a 10-year veteran of  the UN Office of  
Legal Affairs weighed in, stating that he ‘did not recall any previous instance where 
such a formulation was utilized in regard to such claims’.98 Separately, a group of  
international law scholars and practitioners filed an amicus brief  in the IJDH litiga-
tion arguing that the Haitian plaintiffs’ claims fell squarely within section 29 of  the 
General Convention, and were exactly the kinds of  private law claims to which the UN 
had an obligation to respond.99 In the absence of  any UN-established procedure for 
doing so, they argued, the court should reject the UN’s claim to immunity from suit.100
This transnational discourse has not yielded a single clear answer to these ques-
tions about the UN’s treaty obligations, much less an authoritative one. But by partici-
pating in this discourse, transnational actors are contributing to a growing body of  
information that makes it possible for other transnational actors to both reconstruct 
a more complete version of  the UN’s position and to evaluate its merits. These are 
incremental steps – but also necessary steps – towards clarifying the UN’s primary 
obligations under the General Convention and the UN-Haiti SOFA. And to the extent 
that the IO Responsibility Articles are prompting this transnational discourse about 
the UN’s legal obligations, the IO Responsibility Articles are helping to achieve greater 
clarity about these legal obligations.
Since this transnational discourse began, the UN has taken steps to address cholera 
in Haiti directly. In December 2012 – some 13 months after IJDH filed its petition and 
two months before the UN announced its decision to deny the petition – Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon announced a 10-year, US$2.2 billion initiative that would 
invest in prevention, treatment, and education regarding cholera in both Haiti and 
the neighbouring Dominican Republic.101 The UN estimated that about one quarter of  
this amount – $448 million – would be needed for the first two years (2013–2015).102 
In December 2013, the UN reported that about half  of  this amount has been commit-
ted or pledged so far.103
In July 2014, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon prepared to visit Haiti, he made 
a statement that reflected a significant shift in the UN’s rhetoric. ‘Regardless of  what 
the legal implication may be, as the secretary general of  the United Nations and as a 
98 Rashkow, ‘Remedies for Harm Caused by UN Peacekeepers’, AJIL Unbound, 2 Apr. 2014, available at 
www.asil.org/blogs/remedies-harm-caused-un-peacekeepers (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
99 Memorandum of  Law of  Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Practitioners in Support of  
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Government’s Statement of  Interest, Georges v. United Nations, Civil Action 
No. 13-cv-07146-JPO (SDNY, filed 15 May 2014).
100 Ibid.
101 UN News Centre, ‘UN Launches New Initiative to Eliminate Cholera in Haiti and Dominican Republic’, 
11 Dec. 2012, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43743#.VHNFhNLF-QA (last 
visited 24 Nov. 2014).
102 UN Fact Sheet, supra note 61.
103 Ibid.
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person, I feel very sad’, Ban said. He continued, ‘I believe that the international com-
munity, including the United Nations, has a moral responsibility to help the Haitian 
people stem the further spread of  this cholera epidemic.’104 No substantive policy 
changes accompanied this statement.
* * *
The transnational discourse about the UN’s actions and omissions with respect to chol-
era in Haiti is hardly over. There has been no objective or authoritative determination 
that the UN’s conduct in connection with Haiti has violated international law – and 
there may never be. But the transnational discourse has effectively challenged the UN’s 
legal position. And as pressure from that transnational discourse mounted, the UN took 
some action to address cholera in Haiti and the Secretary-General shifted his rhetori-
cal position. It is important to remember that we remain in medias res and the UN may 
still do more – especially if  US courts decline to recognize the organization’s immunity. 
The more transnational actors conclude that the UN’s legal position is untenable, the 
greater the pressure grows on the UN to do more for cholera victims in Haiti.
4 Why Transnational Discourse Matters: IO Legitimacy 
and Reputation
This section returns to a more general question about the role of  transnational 
discourse in influencing IOs. Suppose that the IO Responsibility Articles will both 
spur and structure transnational discourse about what IOs’ international obliga-
tions are, whether IOs are complying with them, and the consequences of  viola-
tions. Is there reason to think that that discourse will affect the actions or decisions 
of  IOs or their member states? This section argues that the answer is yes. In short, 
here’s why. The perception that an IO is legitimate (i.e., its sociological legitimacy) 
depends in part on the perception that the organization is complying with its inter-
national obligations.105 That perception is forged through the transnational dis-
course described in section 2. Legitimacy and effectiveness of  IOs are tightly linked 
because IOs depend on voluntary state cooperation and state financial support to 
carry out their decisions and operations. Unless they are perceived as legitimate, IOs 
104 Charles, ‘United Nations Top Official Goes to Haiti to Promote Cholera Elimination, Elections’, Miami 
Herald, 13 July 2014.
105 See, e.g., Grant and Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of  Power in World Politics’, 99 Am Pol Science 
Rev (2005) 29, at 35; Buchanan and Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of  Global Governance Institutions’, 20 
Ethics and Int’l Affairs (2006) 405, at 405. There is at least one exceptional example where IO legitimacy 
was decoupled from legality: the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo explicitly pronounced the action ‘illegal but legiti-
mate’. The decoupling of  legality and legitimacy reflects an unusually wide gap between what interna-
tional law required (no use of  force without authorization from the SC, which was not forthcoming) and 
a morally acceptable result (forgoing the use of  force would permit Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign of  
ethnic cleansing to continue unabated).
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will have a difficult time securing either one.106 IOs that are less effective because 
they are perceived to be illegitimate will be less useful to their member states and 
may even risk being shut down.107 Because IOs that are perceived to be illegitimate 
will be less effective, IOs and their member states will take pains to ensure that IOs 
avoid – or respond to – credible charges that they are violating international law.
In addition to explaining why the IO Responsibility Articles can have practical 
effect, this account constitutes a first step towards constructing a theoretical account 
of  why IOs comply with their international legal obligations. International relations 
theorists and international lawyers have offered many accounts of  why states comply 
with international law – but to date they have not asked the same question of  IOs. 
Legal process theorists – who share the view that transnational discourse matters – 
offer various accounts about how that discourse induces states to comply with their 
international obligations. Two of  these rely on both reputation and transnational 
discourse.
Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes argue that states have a propensity 
to comply with their international obligations because they have a functional need 
to be accepted members in good standing of  the international community.108 It is 
only by participating in various international regimes as members in good standing 
that states can achieve their principal purposes: security, economic well-being, and 
a decent level of  amenity for their citizens.109 Transnational discourse, on Chayes’ 
and Chayes’ account, reinforces states’ propensity to comply with their international 
treaty obligations.110
Ian Johnstone blends constructivist and rational-choice approaches (the latter posit 
that states pursue their exogenously defined interests through international interac-
tions).111 Johnstone argues that states derive instrumental benefits from maintaining 
a reputation for compliance with international law. IO membership, in turn, heightens 
the value to states of  maintaining a good reputation: states that benefit from partici-
pating in international institutions will want to preserve a reputation obtained from 
playing by the rules so that they can continue to benefit from those institutions.112 
Transnational discourse also affects states’ interests as they internalize the norms of  
the regimes in which they participate.113
106 Buchanan and Keohane, supra note 105, at 407 (describing practical implications of  judgments about 
legitimacy); see also T.M. Franck, The Power of  Legitimacy among Nations (1990), at 24 (‘Legitimacy is 
a property … of  a rule-making institution which exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed 
normatively.’).
107 Koremenos et al., ‘The Rational Design of  International Institutions’, 55 Int’l Org (2001) 761, at 768 
(arguing that ‘over the long haul states gain by participating in specific institutions – or else they will 
abandon them.’); Sadurska and Chinkin, ‘The Collapse of  the International Tin Council: A Case of  State 
Responsibility?’, 30 Virginia J Int’l L (1990) 845, at 888 (‘[A]ny international organization needs a ‘life 
supporting’ system which resides in the national administrations.’).
108 Chayes and Chayes, supra note 42, at 27–28.
109 Ibid., at 4–9, 27.
110 Ibid., at 25.
111 Johnstone, supra note 42, at 7.
112 Ibid., at 46.
113 Ibid., at 47–48.
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Some rational-choice scholars have responded sceptically to accounts that credit 
discourse with causing states to comply with their international obligations. They 
acknowledge that states often use legal rhetoric and defend their actions in legal terms, 
but, they argue, talk is cheap and a poor indicator of  what states will actually do.114 
Rational-choice scholars generally agree that maintaining a reputation as a reliable 
international partner will sometimes induce states to comply with their international 
obligations. A bad reputation imposes costs, which may include exclusion from future 
opportunities to cooperate or tougher terms of  cooperation.115 Rational-choice schol-
ars disagree, however, about how often – if  ever – concerns about avoiding a bad repu-
tation will trump states’ short-term interests in non-compliance.116 This article argues 
that the reasons these scholars have adduced for doubting the significance of  reputa-
tion and legal discourse in inducing states to comply with international law have far 
less force as applied to IOs.
A IOs’ Reputation for Compliance
The universe of  IOs is diverse. IOs vary in the breadth or specificity of  their missions, 
in their criteria for membership, in the extent of  their authorities, and in the allocation 
of  those authorities between organs made up of  member states and organs made up 
of  international civil servants. Some political scientists have modelled relationships 
between member states and IOs in principal–agent terms.117 Others emphasize the 
degree of  IO autonomy and implicitly or explicitly challenge the appropriateness of  
the principal–agent model.118 For purposes of  this argument, resolving this debate is 
unnecessary. Under both views, member states and international civil servants have 
discretion. This article argues that both have reason to heed transnational discourse 
and exercise that discretion in a way that protects IOs’ reputations for compliance 
with international law.
Defending an IO’s reputation is, moreover, an ongoing project. An IO’s reputation 
– and by extension its legitimacy – is not established once and for all. On the contrary, 
it is always vulnerable to charges of  non-compliance with international law by trans-
national actors.119
Time and again, IO officials have emphasized the fundamental importance of  com-
pliance with international law for the effectiveness of  their operations. Consider two 
examples. François Gianviti, former General Counsel for the IMF, wrote:
114 J. L. Goldsmith and E. A. Posner, The Limits of  International Law (2006), at 169–171.
115 Brewster, ‘Unpacking the State’s Reputation’, 50 Harvard Int’l LJ (2009) 231, at 231–232, 248, 
257–258.
116 Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 114, at 102–103 (expressing concern that role of  reputation in caus-
ing compliance has been overstated; Brewster, supra note 115 (same). Others argue that long-term inter-
ests carry more weight. See, e.g., R.  O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (1984); Guzman, supra note 11, at 33–41, 71–117.
117 See, e.g., D.G. Hawkins et al. (eds), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (2006).
118 Barnett and Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of  International Organizations’, 53 Int’l 
Org (1999) 699; Halberstam, ‘The Bride of  Messina: Constitutionalism and Democracy in Europe’ 30 
European L Rev (2005) 775.
119 Hurd, ‘The Strategic Use of  Liberal Internationalism’, 59 Int’l Org (2005) 495, at 501.
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International organizations are also subject to the rule of  law. Their members, their debtors 
and their creditors all expect them to carry out their activities at all times in conformity with 
the rules that apply to them. However, the international financial organizations, including the 
Fund, are helping their member countries in developing sound frameworks for governance and 
better legal and judicial systems, all of  which highlights the rule of  law as a central element of  
development. If  international organizations are to be successful at this task, they must be cred-
ible. To be credible, they must apply the rule of  law to their own situation, just as they encour-
age others to apply it to theirs.120
Louise Arbour, a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Mac Darrow, a 
former official in that office, have emphasized the same point with respect to the UN’s 
obligations to avoid causing or contributing to human rights violations:
The United Nations has an especially high onus to discharge so as to be taken seriously and 
fulfill its unique normative role in the human rights field. Its effectiveness in encouraging com-
pliance with human rights norms lies in the balance, as does its very legitimacy.121
Scholars who question the significance of  reputation point out that the value of  a rep-
utation for complying with international law is not the same for every state.122 Indeed, 
some states may find it preferable to cultivate other kinds of  reputations. Strong states 
may believe that they will be better able to achieve their foreign policy objectives by 
establishing reputations for toughness, while others may prefer to cultivate reputa-
tions for irrationality or unpredictability.123 Reputations that may be appealing to iso-
lationist states like North Korea, however, are simply unavailable to IOs. Even more 
than states, IOs need to be members in good standing of  the international commu-
nity because they depend on their member states for their continued existence.124 The 
stakes of  maintaining a reputation for complying with international law are thus typi-
cally higher for IOs than for states. For an IO, the cost of  a bad reputation may include 
termination.
A reputation for complying with legal obligations may also be more important to 
IOs than to states because the risk that the organization’s immunities will be stripped 
away remains salient. IOs generally enjoy comprehensive immunity from suit in 
national courts. But IOs are usually cautious about their privileges and immunities, 
and often take steps to avoid the charge that they are abusing them. The UN General 
Assembly, for example, cited its intention ‘to prevent the occurrence of  any abuse’ in 
connection with its immunities when, in 1946, it instructed the Secretary General 
to make sure that the drivers of  all UN cars were properly insured.125 Similarly, the 
World Bank established an administrative tribunal to resolve disputes with its staff  
120 Gianviti, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary Fund’ (2002), at para. 
60, available at www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/gianv3.pdf  (last visited 24 Nov. 
2014).
121 Darrow and Arbour, ‘The Pillar of  Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of  the United 
Nations’, 103 AJIL (2009) 446, at 461.
122 See Guzman, supra note 11, at 75–76.
123 Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 114, at 102–103; Keohane, ‘International Relations and International 
Law: Two Optics’, 38 Harvard Int’l LJ (1997) 487, at 497.
124 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
125 GA Res. 22 (I), part E, 13 Feb. 1946
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members in part to ensure that national courts continued to respect its immunity.126 
The Legal Counsel for the World Intellectual Property Organization observed that IOs 
insert arbitration clauses in all commercial contracts and purchase agreements with 
private parties in order to both ‘meet[] their obligations and avoid[] the criticism that 
international organizations hide behind their privileges and immunities’.127
Before a violation can affect a state’s (or IO’s) reputation, the violation must be 
detected.128 Detection cannot be taken for granted; states monitor each other imper-
fectly, and states can (and do) take steps to conceal violations.129 Unlike states, IOs lack 
territory of  their own: they act in the territory of  other states. Compared with many 
states, IO decision-making procedures are relatively transparent. They will usually 
involve a range of  actors from outside the IO, including, at the very least, representa-
tives of  member states. For these reasons, IOs may be less likely than states to be able 
to shield their reputations by concealing violations.
Should they occur, violations of  international law will usually exact a high toll on 
IOs’ reputations. IOs’ reputations may suffer more than states’ reputations from viola-
tions for another reason. The states that take the biggest reputational hits from violat-
ing international law are those with the best reputations for compliance. After all, if  
no one expects a state to comply with its obligations in the first place, a new violation 
will confirm rather than damage its reputation.130 Expectations that IOs will comply 
with their international obligations, however, are generally high.
Member states also have incentives to invest in the legitimacy and reputation of  
existing IOs. After all, IOs are not easily replaced. Establishing new IOs – especially new 
IOs with universal membership – is not impossible, but it is very costly. The difficulty 
of  establishing new IOs makes it harder for states to treat existing IOs as disposable.
Critics of  legal process theory have downplayed the significance of  discourse, argu-
ing that it will secure compliance only where cooperation is shallow and states do not 
have much to gain from violations.131 Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner go further; they 
discount almost entirely the significance of  international discourse.132 Most interna-
tional discourse, they argue, is ‘a kind of  empty happy talk’ that is ‘largely a cere monial 
usage designed to enable the speaker to assert policies and goals without overtly admit-
ting that he or she is acting for a purpose to which others might object’.133
Whatever force these objections may have with respect to states, they do not carry 
over to IOs. IOs cannot afford to engage in ‘empty happy talk’ about their compliance 
with their international obligations. For IOs, such talk is inevitably expensive. A false 
claim that an IO is complying with a particular obligation imperils the IO’s reputation 
126 Amerasinghe, ‘The World Bank Administrative Tribunal’, 31 Int’l & Comp LQ (1982) 748, at 750.
127 Kwakwa, ‘An International Organisation’s Point of  View’, in J.  Wouters et  al. (eds), Accountability for 
Human Rights Violations by International Organizations (2010) 591, at 600 note 17.
128 Guzman, supra note 11, at 96.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., at 83–84.
131 See Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, ‘Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?’, 
50 Int’l Org (1996) 379.
132 Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 114, at 169–171.
133 Ibid., at 180–181.
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and its perceived legitimacy. As explained above, violations of  international law by 
IOs may be particularly likely to be discovered. If  evidence is unearthed that an IO is 
violating an international legal obligation, a wide range of  transnational actors have 
available to them a wide range of  forums in which to press the charge that the IO is in 
breach. If  these charges are credible, they pose a risk to the legitimacy and reputation 
of  an IO that both the IO and its member states have reason to protect.
A different objection that might be raised to this account of  both IO reputation and 
legitimacy is that it defines too narrowly what makes IOs useful to their member states. 
Perhaps IOs are useful to their member states because they provide an opportunity to 
shift blame or shirk responsibility for unpopular or unsuccessful policies.134 Maybe, for 
example, the IMF serves as a convenient bogeyman or scapegoat for its member states. 
Because the IMF imposes and enforces conditions on its loans, the IMF becomes the 
target of  borrowing states’ ire while individual states escape it.135 On this account, UN 
peacekeeping could be similarly useful. Individual member states benefit from appearing 
responsive to conflicts abroad by establishing a peacekeeping force, and then to blame 
the UN when the conflict persists – even when part of  the problem is that the Security 
Council provided the peacekeepers with insufficient authorities or personnel.136
Even if  member states do use IOs to shift blame in this way, they should still care 
about protecting the organizations’ legitimacy and reputation for complying with 
their international obligations.137 A  delegitimized IMF will not be very effective at 
enforcing policy conditions on its loans. And Security Council members will hardly be 
able to make the case that they have dispatched their responsibility to ‘do something’ 
about an international conflict by establishing a peacekeeping force if  peacekeeping 
forces are patently ineffective or regularly violate international humanitarian law. 
One can credibly shift blame for failure to an IO only if  there is reason to believe that 
the IO could plausibly have succeeded.138
B Deflecting Threats to Legitimacy and Reputation
The desire to preserve an IO’s legitimacy and reputation for compliance with interna-
tional law has spurred three different responses when that reputation is challenged. In 
some cases IO organs comprised entirely of  member states took these actions; in other 
cases, international civil servants did. Regardless of  whether states or international 
civil servants were the key actors for a particular decision, the steps they took to deflect 
threats to legitimacy and reputation fall into three categories; the UN’s response to 
cholera in Haiti suggests a fourth.
134 See Vaubel, ‘A Public Choice Approach to International Organization’, 51 Public Choice (1986) 39.
135 Ibid., at 49.
136 K. Annan with N. Mousavizadeh, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (2012), at 34–39.
137 But see Wilde, ‘Enhancing Accountability at the International Level: The Tension between International 
Organization and Member State Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake’, 12 ILSA J Int’l & Comp 
L (2006) 395, at 411, 414 (arguing that states have an interest in designing unaccountable IOs).
138 Cf. M. Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organizations (1998), 
at 28–30 (arguing that one necessary criterion for holding a person or entity responsible for a given state 
of  affairs is the ‘real possibility of  acting otherwise than one actually did.’).
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First, and most obviously, IOs sometimes take steps to comply with the relevant 
international norm. Numerous examples of  IOs taking such steps – even without 
resolving debates about whether those norms bind the IO – testify to the importance 
to IOs of  avoiding reputations for being outlaws.139 In 1999, UN Secretary-General 
Kofi  Annan mooted decades of  debate about whether international humanitarian 
law binds the UN – and specifically UN peacekeepers. Annan adopted a regulation 
requiring peacekeepers to comply with both the fundamental principles and rules of  
international humanitarian law and to protect civilian populations and the natural 
environment in ways that exceeded the requirements of  customary international 
law.140 More recently, UN Security Council sanctions targeting individuals and entities 
associated with Al-Qaida have been criticized in transnational discourse for violat-
ing human rights norms.141 European courts struck down regulations implementing 
the sanctions regime for failing to comply with fundamental rights protected by the 
European legal order.142 Facing threats to the legitimacy and effectiveness of  the sanc-
tions regime, the Security Council adopted a series of  incremental reforms.143
Second, the IO may cease the activity that is the source of  the challenge to the 
IO’s reputation. One example involves comprehensive economic embargoes by the 
Security Council. Starting in the 1990s, these embargoes encountered growing oppo-
sition because of  the suffering they imposed on the civilian population in targeted 
states. Some scholars argued that imposing comprehensive economic embargoes vio-
lated the Security Council’s obligations to protect and promote human rights.144 The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasized that IOs imposing 
sanctions have obligations to respect those rights.145 The Security Council responded 
(albeit not directly) by turning away from comprehensive economic embargoes and 
increasingly resorting to more limited types of  economic sanctions.146
Another example concerns sanctions that the Security Council imposed on Libya 
in the wake of  the bombing of  Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Aiming to 
139 See, e.g., De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of  International Organizations’, in Wouters et al., supra 
note 127, at 51, 104–108 (explaining the ‘extraordinary proliferation’ of  mechanisms to ensure IOs 
comply with human rights norms as due, in part, to the ‘obvious need for international organizations to 
build their legitimacy’).
140 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Observance by United Nations Forces of  International Humanitarian Law, 
UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 Aug. 1999; Shraga, supra note 27, at 408–409.
141 See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 42, at 108–111.
142 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I-6351; Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and 
others v. Kadi [2013] ECR I-0000.
143 See SC Res. 1730, 19 Dec. 2006 (establishing focal point to receive de-listing requests); SC Res. 1904, 17 
Dec. 2009 (establishing Office of  the Ombudsperson to consider de-listing requests); SC Res. 1989, 17 
June 2011 (expanding the Ombudsperson’s authorities).
144 See Reisman and Stevick, ‘The Applicability of  International Law Standards to United Nations Economic 
Sanctions Programs’, 9 EJIL (1998) 86; Reinisch, supra note 45.
145 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 8: The Relationship Between 
Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8, 12 
Dec. 1997. 
146 See Hufbauer and Oegg, ‘Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?’, 32 L & Policy Int’l Bus (2000) 11; 
Cortright and Lopez, ‘Reforming Sanctions’, in D.M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council (2004) 167.
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delegitimize the sanctions, Libya argued that the Security Council had violated inter-
national law by imposing sanctions before the two Libyan suspects had even been 
tried.147 Libya also maintained that the Security Council had unlawfully circum-
vented the dispute resolution procedures set out in the Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of  Unlawful Acts against the Safety of  Civil Aviation and initiated pro-
ceedings before the ICJ to vindicate this claim. Libya’s legal arguments found a sym-
pathetic audience among some states – and emboldened them to defy the Security 
Council.148 In 1998, the Organization of  African Unity adopted a formal resolution 
deciding not to comply with the sanctions regime on the grounds of  its illegality.149 As 
rates of  non-implementation increased still further, the crumbling sanctions regime 
threatened to expose the Council as out of  step with the international community. 
The Security Council could impose binding legal obligations on states to sanction 
Libya, but it could not force them to follow through. The Security Council deflected 
the challenge to its legitimacy by accepting a compromise that the United States and 
the United Kingdom had previously dismissed as a ‘non-starter’ – and suspending the 
sanctions regime.150
The stronger the argument that an IO is violating a particular norm, the greater the 
reputational threat that continued violation poses, and the more likely it is that the IO 
and its member states will take steps to deflect that threat. And yet, in all of  these sur-
veyed examples, when IOs have taken steps to eliminate conflicts with particular norms 
(either by coming into compliance with them or by ceasing the challenged activity), 
they have taken them without explicitly acknowledging that international law obliged 
them to do so. Secretary-General Annan adopted the regulation requiring peacekeepers 
to comply with humanitarian law without acknowledging that UN forces are directly 
bound by the Geneva Conventions or customary international law.151 The Security 
Council has acknowledged in general terms that the Al-Qaida sanctions regimes faced 
‘challenges, both legal and otherwise’, but never conceded that the changes it made 
were legally required.152 A course correction by the IO, then, is not necessarily coupled 
with an authoritative resolution of  the underlying legal issues.
This is not to suggest that IOs will always be silent in transnational discourse.153 Indeed, 
a third way to deflect the reputational harm from violating an international obligation is 
to contest that the obligation in question actually binds the IO. As noted earlier, there is 
considerable uncertainty about some of  the primary norms that bind IOs.154 And failure 
147 Hurd, supra note 119; see also Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of  the United Nations Security Council 
(2004), at 348–350 (arguing that the SC’s resolutions regarding Libya were illegal because of  ‘the 
absence of  due process in the adoption of  the binding requests for extradition’ and the ‘biased way in 
which Libya’s responsibility for the Lockerbie incident was determined.’).
148 Hurd, supra note 119, at 519–520 (‘Having a legal justification for defection reduced the political costs 
enough to change the balance [of  incentives for states only weakly attached to the sanctions regime].’).
149 Organization of  African Unity, Doc. AHG/Dcl. 127 (XXXIV), 10 June 1998.
150 Hurd, supra note 119, at 518.
151 Ratner, ‘Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of  
Convergence’, 16 EJIL (2005) 695, at 705.
152 SC Res. 1989, 17 June 2011.
153 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 9.
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to comply with a norm that does not bind the IO should not affect the IO’s reputation for 
compliance with international law – and by extension this facet of  the IO’s legitimacy.155 
The IMF took this third option in response to arguments by scholars and advocates that 
the IMF had violated its obligations to comply with international norms contained in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The IMF General 
Counsel published an extensive legal analysis rebutting those arguments.156 This legal 
analysis triggered further rejoinders, of  course.157 But the IMF’s vigorous legal response 
appears to have eased the pressure to respond to the threat to its reputation through the 
kinds of  actions described above.158
Initially the UN’s response to Haiti on cholera fitted the third category described 
above – denial of  any relevant primary obligations. Unlike the IMF in the example set 
out above, however, the UN did not publicly engage in a detailed legal argument. The 
UN’s conclusory sentences rejecting the Haitian petitioners’ claim failed to quell the 
controversy. Indeed, the UN’s initial response has been described as a ‘public relations 
as well as public health disaster’159 – and might initially appear to contradict rather 
than confirm this article’s account that IOs are motivated to protect their reputations.
The subsequent actions that the UN has taken, however, suggest a fourth way in 
which IOs may deflect threats to their reputation posed by credible charges that they 
have violated international law. Specifically, IOs may seek to preserve their reputations 
by adhering to the obligations that the IO Responsibility Articles would impose as a 
consequence of  a breach. The UN has emphatically not framed the cholera initiative 
in terms of  the IO Responsibility Articles. And yet, the steps that it has taken – leading 
an initiative to eradicate cholera from Haiti and acknowledging a moral responsibil-
ity to do so – could be characterized as an incomplete effort to make reparations as 
required by the IO Responsibility Articles.160 Reparation may involve restitution (re-
establishing the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed), paying 
compensation for all financially assessable damage caused by the breach, and giving 
satisfaction (by means of, inter alia, an acknowledgement of  the breach, an expres-
sion of  regret, or a formal apology).161 Like the State Responsibility Articles, the IO 
Responsibility Articles rank the three forms of  reparation, with a preference for res-
titution followed by compensation and satisfaction. Restitution is required unless it is 
materially impossible or involves a burden out of  all proportion to the benefit.162
155 Cf. Brewster, supra note 115, at 265 (arguing that the Soviet Union’s violation of  the non-binding Helsinki 
Accords would not affect its reputation for strict legal compliance with international law, although it 
might affect its reputation for general willingness to cooperate with other states).
156 Gianviti, supra note 120.
157 See, e.g., A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of  Non-State Actors (2006), at 137–150.
158 Cf. Swaine, supra note 155, at 340 (arguing that entering a reservation to at treaty may bolster a state’s 
reputation for compliance with international law because the reservations ‘show that [states] take treaty 
commitments seriously enough to broadcast when they cannot comply’).
159 Alvarez, ‘The United Nations in the Time of  Cholera’, AJIL Unbound, 4 Apr. 2014, available at www.asil.
org/blogs/united-nations-time-cholera (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
160 IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, Art. 31 (requiring full reparations for injuries caused by IOs’ 
internationally wrongful acts).
161 Ibid., Arts 34–37.
162 Ibid., Arts 35, 36(1), and 37(1).
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Eradicating cholera from Haiti would partially restore the status quo before UN 
peacekeepers introduced cholera – although it would not, of  course, revive the indi-
viduals who died from cholera or undo the suffering of  those sickened by it. For that 
reason, even if  successful, the UN’s efforts to eradicate cholera would serve as partial 
rather than full reparation. It remains to be seen whether the UN will offer any com-
pensation to victims. And the Secretary-General’s statement from July 2014, which 
expressed sadness and accepted moral responsibility for the UN, tracks examples of  
satisfaction adduced by the ILC in its commentary to the IO Responsibility Articles. 
Like the Secretary-General’s statement, the examples cited by the ILC do not expressly 
refer to the existence of  a breach of  an international obligation. And yet, the ILC 
stated, they serve as ‘one of  the appropriate legal consequences’ of  such breaches.163
Conclusion
The ILC’s work on the IO Responsibility Articles has been dismissed by some states, 
IOs, and academics as both premature and irrelevant. This article has argued that 
the IO Responsibility Articles are neither. They are not premature because they can 
help to clarify the content of  the primary international law norms that bind IOs. And 
they are not irrelevant because their invocation by transnational actors can spur IOs 
to both participate in transnational discourse about their legal obligations and take 
action to cease, correct, or make reparations for violations of  international law.
There are, of  course, still other ways in which the IO Responsibility Articles 
could have practical effect. As the work product of  the ILC, the IO Responsibility 
Articles lack the status of  binding law except to the extent that they reflect cus-
tomary international law. The more the IO Responsibility Articles are invoked in 
transnational discourse, the more likely they are to shape practice and, in turn, 
prompt the further development of  customary international law regarding IO 
Responsibility.
More broadly, to the extent that the IO Responsibility Articles are invoked in trans-
national discourse, they will reinforce the expectation that IOs comply with their 
international obligations. In turn, that could make it harder for IO officials or member 
states to dismiss out of  hand arguments that an IO might violate international law 
in any particular instance. The idea that IOs should comply with their international 
obligations would become part of  the ‘taken-for-granted script[]’ of  how IOs ought to 
behave.164
Over time, these dynamics may serve to legitimate the IO Responsibility Articles as 
well. Each time various transnational actors invoke the IO Responsibility Articles, they 
implicitly signal their acceptance of  those Articles. As this process is repeated over 
163 Ibid., at 128, paras 1–4.
164 Cf. R.  Goodman and D.  Jinks, Socializing States (2013), at 137–138; Goodman and Jinks, ‘Toward an 
Institutional Theory of  Sovereignty’, 55 Stanford L Rev (2003) 1749, at 1765–1780 (describing how 
state actors often embrace common beliefs and practices because they reflect certain taken-for-granted 
scripts of  how ‘liberal’ or ‘modern’ states behave – and these deeply held self-understandings of  the pur-
pose and character of  modern statehood drive certain aspects of  state policy).
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time and across a broad range of  actors, the IO Articles as a whole – or at least those 
articles that are consistently accepted – may gain a legitimacy that they lacked at the 
moment that the ILC adopted them.
At the same time, transnational discourse over particular facets of  IO responsibility 
may yield a widespread rejection or persistent contestation of  specific rules contained in 
the ILC’s IO Responsibility Articles rather than acceptance. Should this occur, it should be 
viewed as a valuable and welcome contribution to the development of  international law. 
Recall that the State Responsibility Articles are considered effective because of  the readiness 
with which international courts and tribunals have applied them. Some commentators 
have worried that they are doing so too readily – without scrutinizing the content of  the 
rules or whether they actually reflect customary international law. The result is a missed 
opportunity to revise the State Responsibility Articles where they are found wanting.165
Regardless of  the fate of  the IO Responsibility Articles, the question why IOs comply 
with their international obligations remains a pressing one. This article has begun to 
sketch an account that emphasizes transnational discourse and its effects on reputa-
tion. Future work will provide opportunities to test this work in a wider range of  IOs 
and IO activities, and to refine this account to identify those circumstances in which 
the mechanisms this article identifies will be more or less effective.166
Future work will also provide an opportunity to evaluate the ways in which this 
account might complement accounts that are based on internalization of  norms. The 
role of  norm internalization in changing the behaviour of  IO officials is not entirely 
straightforward for two reasons. First, IO officials whose work is geared entirely 
towards ensuring states comply with their international obligations are often slow 
to acknowledge the applicability of  those obligations to their own work.167 Secondly, 
some international law norms have proved to be difficult to internalize because they 
do not fit easily with the institutional culture. Galit Sarfaty, for example, argues that 
human rights remain a marginal issue at the World Bank in part because of  the domi-
nance of  economists on its staff.168
This article’s account of  why IOs comply with their international obligations con-
tributes to efforts to overcome the divide between rational-choice theories and norm-
based theories of  why states comply with international law.169 As other scholars have 
observed, IOs provide a promising subject for doing so.170 This article both assumes 
that state interactions with IOs of  which they are member states are strategic and 
165 Caron, supra note 38, at 861.
166 For example, IOs with limited membership will be less concerned about their reputations in the interna-
tional community as a whole because they depend on only a fraction of  that community for their contin-
ued existence.
167 See, e.g., Mégret and Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 337.
168 Sarfaty, ‘Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of  Human Rights at the 
World Bank’, 103 AJIL (2009) 647.
169 Some scholars have sought to reconcile or move beyond these theories in explaining state compliance 
with international law. Johnstone, supra note 42; Goodman and Jinks, supra note 164, Socializing States, 
at 21.
170 Hurd, supra note 119, at 497; Abbott and Snidal, ‘Why States Act through International Organizations’, 
42 J Conflict Res (1998) 3, at 25–26.
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consistent with rational-choice models: that is, it assumes that states establish IOs and 
continue to support them over time because member states find them useful for pursu-
ing various policy goals. But it also posits that legal norms and legal discourse are con-
sequential, and offers an account of  why rational states acting in their own interests 
have reason to take legal discourse about IOs seriously. This article thus merges ratio-
nal-choice and norm-based approaches in part by explaining why some of  the objec-
tions that rational-choice theorists have advanced for discounting legal discourse will 
systematically have less force with respect to IOs.
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